poor accuracy for certain trial sequences. On the other hand, absolute accounts predict that data from experiments with unequally spaced stimuli should not be radically different from standard data. To illustrate the point, consider the relative judgment models of Laming (1984) , Holland and Lockhead (1968) , and Stewart et al. (2005) , and, for simplicity of the example, ignore sequential effects. These models depend critically upon a single estimate for the difference between adjacent stimulus magnitudes. This "spacing" estimate is used to scale the psychological difference between the current and previous stimulus into a difference in response units. The resulting estimate of the response difference between the current and previous stimulus is then added to the numeric feedback for the previous trial 2 . This numeric feedback informs the participant of the correct response for the previous stimulus, and so when the estimated response difference between the previous and current stimulus is added, a response can be generated for the current stimulus.
When the stimuli used in an experiment are unequally spaced, this process breaks down in the obvious manner. The single estimate used for the spacing between adjacent stimuli cannot capture all of the different spacings that exist between different stimuli.
The relative model is forced into a compromise when scaling from stimulus differences to response differences, using some average estimate of the spacing between stimuli. This average estimate leads to errors whenever the current and prior stimuli are separated by Relative Models MS# R455 Page 6 spacings that are different from the average estimate. We develop the above argument more formally in the Appendix. There, we set out a very basic model that captures the core elements of relative judgment, but includes no extra components, such as random variability or sequential effects. We show that when stimuli are unequally spaced, the basic model predicts very low accuracy for certain combinations of current and prior stimulus magnitudes, regardless of the values given to the model's parameters. Below, we test this prediction using data from an experiment with unequally spaced stimuli,
replicating Lockhead and Hinson's (1986) design. The simple model we analyze in the Appendix does not include many of the extra components used in cutting-edge relative models, so our analyses will not apply perfectly to those accounts. Therefore, we also
show that the leading relative model (the RJM) cannot account for our data, or those from one of Lacouture's (1997) unequal spacing experiments. These analyses confirm that the same problems are observed in cutting edge relative models as are found in the basic architecture analyzed in the Appendix.
Methods

Participants
Introductory psychology students from the University of Newcastle took part in the study, receiving course credit as compensation: ten participants in the low spread condition, and eight in each of the other two conditions.
Stimuli
There were three spacing conditions: low spread, even spread and high spread. In each condition the stimuli were three 1000Hz tones of different intensities. The range of Relative Models MS# R455 Page 7 tone intensities was different in each condition, as illustrated in Figure 1 . In the even spread condition the tones were equally spaced at 79dB, 82dB and 85dB. Stimuli in the other conditions were identical, except that in the low spread condition, stimulus #1 was made less intense (73dB), and in the high spread condition stimulus #3 was made more intense (91dB).
Procedure
Each participant was randomly assigned to either the low, even or high spread condition. Each condition had three phases: digit identification, practice, and a test phase.
The digit identification block was 90 trials in length, during which participants responded to a series of electronically pre-recorded numbers (1, 2 or 3). They were asked to press the corresponding number key on a regular keyboard; each number was played via headphones thirty times, in random order. This phase was intended to examine baseline reaction times for unambiguous stimuli, so that differences in mean response times for the three different response buttons (and fingers) could be identified. During practice, each of the three tones was played once, in ascending order of intensity. Each tone was labeled with the number 1, 2 or 3, which appeared on screen while the tone was played.
Participants were required to press the corresponding key to continue. For example, "This is tone number 1, if you think you have heard this tone, press 1 to continue". The test phase had 10 blocks. In each block, each stimulus was presented 30 times, with the order of the 90 trials being randomized. On each trial, a visual cue (+) was displayed for 500ms, then the stimulus was played for 1000ms, and the participant had up to 20 seconds to respond. If no response was made, the next trial was presented and a missing value recorded. If a response was incorrect, the correct answer was displayed on the screen for 1000ms. If the response was correct, "Correct" was displayed on screen for 1000ms. Participants were required to take a minimum 30 second break between each block.
Results
Response times faster than 180msec or slower than 5sec were removed from the analysis, which accounted for fewer than 1% of trials in each condition. Results from the digit identification block showed there were no substantial differences in response speed across stimuli #1-#3, on average response times were 642msec, 678msec and 635msec respectively, and this pattern was maintained within the three experimental conditions. show the correct response was most frequent for each of stimuli #1-#3 -78%, 79% and 87%, respectively. There was a slight asymmetry, with the softest stimulus identified less accurately, and more slowly, than might be expected relative to the loudest stimulus. Figure 2 replicates the key aspects of Lockhead and Hinson (1986 What is more interesting is that the remaining two stimuli in the low-and highspread conditions are more often confused than in the even spread condition, even though these two stimuli are physically identical across pairs of conditions. For example, stimuli #1 and #2 are physically identical in the even spread and the high spread conditions (79dB and 82dB in both cases), yet they are more often confused in the high spread condition than the even spread condition. In the even spread condition, response #1 is given on 11% of presentations of stimulus #2, and but this rises to 19% in the high spread condition, and the difference is significant (t(14)=2.6, p=.014). Similar patterns occur (with smaller magnitudes) for the other identical stimulus/response pairs.
An Absolute Account of the Data
Theories using absolute processes naturally account for data from unequally spaced stimuli because they include complete knowledge of the stimulus set, including long-term memories for the magnitudes of all stimuli in the set. When the spacing of the stimuli changes, so do these referents. The tracking process that carries out these changes may be specified in great detail (e.g., Petrov & Anderson, 2005; Treisman & Williams, 1984) , or not (e.g. Brown et al., 2008) , but nevertheless all absolute models include the necessary components. We use Brown et al.'s model (SAMBA) to illustrate. SAMBA assumes that the magnitude of a stimulus is estimated in a noisy and error-prone fashion, which is then compared against long-term memories (referents) for each stimulus. When the physical spacing of certain stimuli is small, relative to the average spacing of stimuli in the entire set, so too is the difference between their referents. Since decisions are based on comparison with these referents, greater confusion is predicted between stimuli that are closer together, relative to the overall context of the experiment -just as observed in the data.
In Figure 2 SAMBA's predictions were generated by adjusting the parameters used by Brown et al. (2008) to fit data from the equally spaced condition of Lacouture's (1997) experiment. To fit the current data set, four parameters were changed. One parameter was were changed to accommodate the asymmetry in the data; these anchor values describe the range of stimuli that the observer sets as relevant for this experiment. Response accuracy is maximized if the range is set identical to the range used in each particular stimulus condition, but observers typically do not quite manage this. We fixed L to be 6dB quieter than the quietest tone in each condition, and U to be 3.3dB louder than the loudest in each condition. An even better fit to the data -particularly the response time asymmetry -could have been obtained by allowing differences in the anchors between conditions. Such differences are plausible, given the between subject manipulation, but our arguments do not rely on small differences in quantitative fit, and so the extra complexity is not necessary.
SAMBA estimates stimulus magnitudes using a selective attention mechanism based on Marley and Cook's (1984) 
The Relative Account
Relative models make the strong prediction that response accuracy for certain stimulus sequences will be very low when stimuli are unequally spaced. For example,
consider the relative models proposed by Laming (1984) or Stewart et al. (2005) . Both models depend critically on a memory for the average spacing between adjacent stimulus magnitudes (λ in Stewart et al.'s model, β in Laming's) . Throughout this paper, we will use the symbol Z i to represent the physical magnitude of the stimulus presented on trial i, measured on a logarithmic scale. The symbol S i is used for the rank of that stimulus within the entire set of stimuli experienced by a participant. In the even spread condition of our experiment, we used three stimuli with physical magnitudes 79dB, 82dB, and 85dB. Relative accounts of absolute identification operate using the knowledge that 3dB
separates adjacent stimuli, as follows. Suppose that the stimulus presented on the previous trial was Z n-1 =79dB (S n-1 =1) and the stimulus presented on the current trial is Z n =82dB (S n =2). The core elements of a relative model would operate by:
1. Estimating the magnitude difference between the current and previous stimulus (in this case, 82dB-79dB = +3dB difference).
2. Transforming the difference estimate into the numerical response scale, using the knowledge that adjacent stimuli are separated by 3dB, so that the +3dB difference is transformed to a difference of +1 response.
3. Converting the response difference into a response by adding it to the correct response from the previous trial, which is known by feedback. Thus, the response on the current trial would be the +1 difference added to the previous correct response (1), yielding the response 2 (which is correct).
When the stimuli are unequally spaced, this process breaks down. Our high spread condition used three stimuli with intensities 79dB, 82dB and 91dB -the loudest stimulus is much louder than before, but the other two are unchanged. Participants performed quite well in this condition, with better than 84% accuracy for each of the three stimuli.
However, consider the relative judgment account of the same trial sequence as above, when stimulus Z n-1 =79dB (S n-1 =1) is followed by stimulus Z n =82dB (S n =2), the magnitude difference is the same as before, +3dB. However, if the observer's long-term memory is based on the average difference between adjacent stimuli, they will use λ=6dB. This causes the observed magnitude difference to be transformed into a numerical response difference of only +½. When this response differences is added to the numeric feedback from the previous trial (1) the model predicts that the response given for the current trial should be equally likely to be 1 (incorrect) as 2 (correct).
Manipulating λ can solve this particular problem, for example by using λ=3dB. However, this simply shifts the problem to other stimulus sequences (e.g., then all trials in which stimulus #2 follows stimulus #3 are classified incorrectly). This type of reasoning is formalized in the Appendix. We call that model the extended RJM, and consider it carefully in the next section. Figure   3 shows that the global fit of the RJM is quite good, with RMSE=.042, which is in the same ballpark as SAMBA's fit (RMSE=.026). When fitting the RJM, we adjusted four parameters: one for the scaling of stimulus differences to response differences (λ); one for the effect of the prior trial on the current decision (α 1 ); a variance parameter (σ); and a decision threshold (χ 1 ). We had to allow the RJM to have different parameter values for the equally-spaced (λ=0.786dB, α 1 =.312, σ=.208, χ 1 =0.702 and χ 2 =4-χ 1 ) and unequally spaced (λ=2.016dB, α 1 =.087, σ=.092, χ 1 =1.36 and χ 2 =4-χ 1 ) conditions. The different opposed to the four used by SAMBA) provide the RJM with some extra flexibility, which may concern some readers; however we were unable to find a common set of parameters that gave a reasonable fit to all three conditions. We also explored even greater parameter freedom for the RJM, by allowing independent parameters for the two response thresholds (χ 1 and χ 2 ) -this version of the model performed only marginally better than the symmetric version described above. Note that the RJM does not make predictions for response times, so Figure 3 shows only response probabilities.
The previous discussion suggests that relative accounts predict very low accuracy for particular stimulus transitions, such as between stimuli #1 and #2 in the high-spread condition and stimuli #2 and #3 in the low-spread condition. Figure 4 graphs the accuracy associated with each stimulus (shown using different symbols) conditional on the previous stimulus (given by the x-axes). The three columns of Figure 4 show these graphs separately for the low-spread, even-spread and high-spread conditions. The top row shows just the data, the second row shows corresponding predictions from SAMBA, and the bottom row shows the predictions made by the RJM.
The top row of Figure 4 show that participants performed quite well on all stimulus transition sequences -even the very worst accuracy was still 71% (when stimulus #1 followed stimulus #3 in the even spread condition). SAMBA's predictions, shown in the second row, match the data quite well (RMSE=.059), and the greatest mismatch between the data and SAMBA's predictions is only .12. In contrast, the predictions for the RJM, on the third row, are very different from the data. Just as expected, the Relative Models MS# R455 Page 15 predicted accuracy for some stimulus transitions is around 50%. The overall RMSE for RJM's fit to the sequential data is more than three times that of SAMBA (.19), as is the greatest mis-match between the sequential data and predictions (.41 ). These analyses demonstrate that the apparently adequate account of the data provided by the RJM in Figure 3 was really a consequence of averaging together large over-predictions for some
conditional accuracy values together with large under-predictions for others. We tried to remedy this mis-fit by adjusting the free parameters of the RJM solely to optimize the fit shown in Figure 4 , ignoring the overall mean response probabilities shown in Figure 3 .
This analysis resulted in a slight improvement in fit, but not enough to change the conclusions to be drawn, nor did it change the predictions of extremely poor performance for certain stimulus transitions. When the model was endowed with almost double the number of free parameters (an extra two for asymmetric response criteria, plus independent free parameters for all three conditions) and when all of those parameters were adjusted to optimize fit for Figure 4 , the overall RMSE for the RJM was still double that of SAMBA (at .12) and the worst mis-fit was still very large (.31).
Lacouture (1997)
Lacouture (1997) also studied absolute identification with unequally spaced stimuli. He used a larger stimulus set, which has the consequence that relative models are less able to trade off under-prediction and over-prediction of the conditional data in order to provide an apparently adequate fit to the unconditional data. In one of his simplest conditions, he used a standard design with ten lines of increasing length that were equally log-spaced except for a large gap between the central pair of lines that was 6 times as large as the other gaps -using arbitrary units 4 for log-length, the lines' lengths were: {1, conditions, all using the same set of parameters. Our analyses (see Appendix) show that the core architecture that underlies relative models makes inappropriate predictions for the choice data. To confirm that these problems are not limited to the basic relative architecture, we also fit the RJM to Lacouture's data. We optimized the RJM's parameters to fit only the data of Figure 5 (σ=0.074, λ=1.75 and C=.136; we could not obtain a better fit by adjusting the five sequential effect parameters α 1-5 ). Other parameter settings allow the RJM to capture the accuracy values for responses 2-4 and 7-9 somewhat better, but always at the expense of far worse predictions for other responses.
As expected from our analytic results, the RJM fits the data very poorly (RMSE=.18).
The relative account of Lacouture's (1997) data fails in exactly the manner predicted by our analysis in the Appendix. There is a tension in the model between transforming the small spacing between stimuli #1-#5 and #6-#10 (just one stimulus spacing unit) to numerical differences on the response scale, and transforming the large gap between stimuli #5 and #6 (six stimulus spacing units) to a numerical difference on For example, it makes inappropriate predictions whenever the current and previous stimuli lie on opposite sides of the large gap (i.e., when the current stimulus is between #1 and #5 and the prior stimulus was between #6 and #10, or vice versa).
These predictions are confirmed by the predicted response probabilities from the RJM fits -for example, when the stimulus given on the previous trial was the largest one (#10) and the current stimulus is the smallest (#1), the RJM always predicted an incorrect response (#3). Lacouture's participants did not show such behavior. Stimulus #10 was followed by stimulus #1 a total of 21 times, but not once did this elicit response #3.
Instead, 17 responses were correct (#1), and the other four were all just one response away (#2). Similar patterns are observed for many other stimulus sequence pairs that involve either very large or very small jumps between successive stimuli, and these result in near chance prediction of the conditional accuracy values by the RJM (RMSE=.44). In contrast, SAMBA fits these same values with RMSE=.17 (Donkin et al., in press) , with the misfit due mostly to a failure to capture the asymmetry in the data due to the responses to stimuli #4 and #5 being less accurate than those to stimuli #6 and #7).
Rescuing the Relative Account
The analyses above suggest that purely relative accounts of absolute identification must fail when stimuli are unequally spaced. In this section, we present two ways by which the relative account can better address data from unequally spaced stimuli.
However, a side effect of both approaches is an increase the amount of long-term stimulus magnitude information used by the model. In each case, this changes the Relative Models MS# R455 Page 18 theoretical account from "purely relative" to either "purely absolute" or a hybrid account which falls somewhere in between the two poles.
Mapping the numeric feedback to stimulus magnitude
In our analysis of the RJM above, Z n and Z n-1 are the physical magnitudes of the current and previous stimuli, measured on a log scale. The difference between these magnitudes is scaled to a difference on the response scale by the parameter λ. Finally, this response-scale difference is added to the feedback given to the participant on the previous trial. This feedback is invariably numeric (one of the digits 1, 2, … , N). For example, in the low-spread condition of our experiment the physical stimulus magnitudes were 73dB, 82dB and 85dB. When stimulus #3 was given, the feedback provided to the subject after their response was the label #3, not the physical magnitude of the stimulus (85dB). Stewart et al. (2005) extend the RJM to accommodate unequally-spaced data from Lockhead and Hinson's (1986) experiment by assuming that the feedback provided to the model about the correct answer for the previous trial (i.e., the label #1, #2 or #3) is transformed by the observer back into a physical stimulus magnitude (e.g., they assume that the observer transforms the label #3 back to the magnitude 85dB, or some representation of that).
There are two problems with this extended RJM. The first problem is that the extension is never mentioned in print. The reader naturally assumes the conventional definition of "feedback": the numeral associated with the correct response. Stewart et al. (2005) admitted to the decision process on trial n is not some representation of the magnitude of S n but a representation of the difference between S n and S n-1 ". Allowing the assumption that the feedback label (F n-1 ) can be transformed by the observer into the stimulus magnitude (Z n-1 ) perfectly solves the problem of fitting the data for unequally spaced stimulus sets. However, making this assumption directly contradicts the core of their model -that stimulus magnitudes are not admitted to the decision process. On a deeper level, assuming that the observer can transform numerical feedback into a stimulus magnitude is equivalent to assuming that the observer is able to rely on long-term referents that encode the absolute magnitude of each stimulus used in the experiment.
This assumption goes against the very core of all purely relative accounts of absolute identification. Even if the assumption that feedback labels are replaced by stimulus magnitudes can be motivated in some way (e.g., by assuming optimization of performance via learning), the resultant effect is still a code of the absolute magnitude of each stimulus in the experiment.
The use of absolute referents might be justified as an versa. In Lacouture's experiment, 50% of trials fit this description. On these trials, a model allowed to use the two-back stimulus as a referent can avoid the problematic situation half of the time, because the two-back stimulus has a 50% chance of being from the same sub-group as the current stimulus. Thus, a model using either the prior or twoback stimulus as a referent strikes a problematic stimulus sequence on only one quarter of trials. The model still makes unreasonable predictions for that 25% of trials, but the global average fit is much improved.
The relative account could be even further improved by allowing the access to the previous three stimuli as referents (or four, or five …). However, the core problem would still remain for particular trial sequences. When given a run of stimuli all from the same sub-group of lines (e.g., several trials in succession all using stimuli #1..#5) a relative model will predict very low accuracy if the next stimulus is drawn from the other subgroup. Such runs of stimuli are sufficiently common in data from large experiments that they cannot be ignored.
Discussion
Relative models of absolute identification (e.g., Laming, 1984; Stewart et al., 2005) have explicitly denied the use of long-term memories for stimulus magnitudes.
Instead, they are based on a more parsimonious representation of the stimulus magnitudes which uses just a single value that maps differences in stimulus magnitudes to differences on the response scale. The scaled difference between the stimulus magnitude on the current and previous trial (plus the distortions due to previous differences) is added to the numeric feedback from the previous trial to generate a value on the response scale. We have shown that this approach fails when the spacing between stimuli is unequal. We also explored ways in which theories based on relative judgment can be modified to alleviate the observed problem. These solutions allow relative models to fit the data very well, but they do so by violating the core assumption of relative accounts. Our analyses (see Appendix) show that these problems are not simply due to poor parameter estimates, or to the particular details of the detailed relative model we tested -instead, the problem arises from the core architecture that underlies all relative judgment models.
The success of absolute models and the failure of relative models is due to the fact can be added and subtracted, but rather as independent labels applied to response accumulators.
It may be possible to escape the above limitation of relative models by using a non-numerical mapping of the type used in SAMBA. A simple version would map the difference between the current and prior stimulus magnitudes, (Z n -Z n-1 ), to some response label that was not necessarily a real number. This response label could then be combined with an appropriate transform of the numeric feedback for the previous trial (F n-1 ) in a cognitive operation that mimics the mathematical operation of addition.
Unfortunately, the same problems we have identified above apply even to such extensions of relative models. In order to appropriately accommodate unequally spaced stimuli, such a model would still require the additional assumption that participants can transform the labels they are given as feedback (e.g., 1, 2, or 3) into stimulus magnitudes (e.g., 58dB, 60dB, 66dB). This transformation can be accomplished by assuming that a long-term referent is maintained for the magnitude of each stimulus, but of course that makes the model absolute, rather than relative. Equivalently, the transformation can be accomplished via a look-up table that remembers the correct response associated with each pair of possible values of {F n-1 , (Z n -Z n-1 )}. As with all the other versions of relative models that can successfully accommodate data from unequally spaced designs, this is just an absolute referent model by another name. All modifications to relative models that allow them to operate with unequally spaced stimuli work by including in the model a representation of the absolute magnitudes of the stimuli. This representation can be incorporated in many forms, such as in the look-up table above, or in an assumed transformation between numeric feedback and stimulus magnitude, or even in the location of response criteria. In all cases, the modification includes in the model a very complete representation of the stimulus magnitudes, which runs counter to the basic tenets of relative judgment.
Our results make it clear that relative judgment based on a single scale factor and numeric feedback cannot provide a general account of absolute identification. However, it is possible that absolute identification is accomplished, at least in some cases, via a cognitive process of relative judgment that relies on a set of absolute referents. Indeed, the SAMBA model incorporates just such a relative process, although it was not used in any of the fits presented here, and was required to account for only one of the many benchmark phenomena fit by Brown et al. (2008) . Similarly, the extension of the RJM to unequally spaced designs discussed above uses relative judgment in addition to a set of long-term memories for stimulus magnitudes. The success of these hybrid models is interesting, and deserves further investigation, particularly given the strong case that has been made for the general importance of relative judgment in cognition (Chater & Brown, 2008) . However, our main point remains -that purely relative processes are insufficient to provide a general account of absolute identification.
We examine the performance of a canonical relative judgment model for absolute identification with correct feedback that is intended as an abstraction of the major assumptions of the RJM (Stewart et al., 2005) and the theoretical frameworks of Laming (1984) and Holland and Lockhead (1968) . One absolute model of absolute identification (SAMBA) also includes a local judgment component (see Brown et al., 2008, p.403-404) that shares some characteristics with relative judgment models. This component does not suffer from the problems outlined below, as it operates on absolute knowledge (including referents for stimulus magnitude estimates).
Consider the "large central gap" condition from Lacouture's (1997) experiment.
This was an absolute identification experiment using 10 lines whose psychophysical magnitudes (Z i ) can be represented using arbitrary units as {1,2,3,4,5,11,12,13,14,15}. That is, there were 10 stimuli, with a gap equal to five missing stimuli in the middle. We examine the performance of a simplified, deterministic relative judgment model for this experiment. We require of this model that:
1. There is a parameter λ>0 that transforms psychophysical differences to numerical differences on the response scale.
2. On each trial, n, a response magnitude estimate M n is produced according to M n =F n-1 +(Z n -Z n-1 )/λ, where Z n and Z n-1 are the log physical magnitudes of the current and previous stimuli and F n-1 is the numeric feedback for the previous trial.
3. The magnitude estimate M n is partitioned into a response by comparison with a set of cut-points C 0 <C 1 < C 2 < … < C 9 <C 10 , with C 0 →-∞ and C 10 →∞.
Response j is given if and only if C j-1 <M n <C j . (For simplicity of exposition, we ignore the case where M n =C i for some i. In any case, this event occurs with probability measure zero in any probabilistic relative judgment model with a continuous response scale.) A more complete model might include extra components, such as variability in several parameters, and influences from earlier stimulus differences such as Z n-3 -Z n-2 . We do not concern ourselves with these details, as they serve only to decrease model performance.
In particular, the magnitude estimate M n usually has zero-mean noise added to it. By considering just the noise-free estimate, we restrict ourselves to considering the most probable response for any given sequence of stimuli.
We require that the model should produce reasonable predictions for absolute identification data. For any combination of Z n and Z n-1 , the most probable response should be the correct one. In our noise-free model, this means that we require C i-1 <i<C i when i, i∈{1,…,10,} is the correct response for the stimulus presented on trial n .
Lemma 1: C i-1 <i<C i for i=1,..,10
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider the case of a repeated stimulus, where the stimulus with rank i is presented on both the current trial (n) and the previous trial (n-1). The resulting magnitude estimate will be M n =i, regardless of the value of λ. To ensure that M n =i is converted into the correct response #i (the integer i), we require that C i-1 <i and C i >i.  Lemma 2: λ < 4/3
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider the case Z n =5 and Z n-1 =1. Then M n =1+4/λ. For the correct response #5 to be issued, we require C 4 <M n <C 5 . From Lemma 1, we know that C 4 >4, so M n >4. After re-arranging, and with our assumption that λ>0, we arrive at λ < 4/3, as required. Theorem: If Z n-1 =11 and Z n =5, the predicted response will be incorrect.
Proof: There is a magnitude difference of -6 units between these stimuli, so the resulting magnitude estimate is M n =6-6/λ. Invoking Lemma 2 gives that M n <1.5.
Invoking Lemma 1 gives therefore that M n <C 2 , so the predicted response is either #1 or #2. Both of these are very different from the correct response #5 (the integer 5).  Various other inconsistencies can be obtained in a similar manner, and these inconsistencies can be made arbitrarily large by considering designs with more stimuli and more unequal spacing. The intuition for the problem is that a small value of λ is required to manage the gaps between closely spaced stimulus magnitudes (1-5, and 11-15) but a large λ is required to manage the large gap (5-11).
The approach to fixing this problem taken by Stewart et al. (2005) , and discussed in the text above, is to transform the numerical feedback on trial n-1 to the absolute psychological magnitude of the stimulus presented on trial n-1. Thus, with R denoting this mapping, the above example requires R(F i )=Z i , for any i.
Step 2 of the relative judgment process is then be replaced by:
2'. On each trial, n, a magnitude estimate is produced according to M n =R(F n-1 )+(Z n -Z n-1 )/λ, where R is defined above such that R(F n-1 )=Z n-1 .
With this adjustment, Lemma 2 does not hold, allowing the modified model to fit the data. 
